Thursday, August 11, 2022

Leitzel (2021) on Regulating Cocaine

Jim Leitzel, “Double Defaults: Behavioral Regulation of Cocaine.” Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy 5(1): 7-12, 2021 [pdf here]. 

• Can we protect against the dangers of excessive or highly risky cocaine use without imposing the huge costs that accompany cocaine prohibition? 

• Yes, we can! We can offer some protection against diseased or impulsive decision-making, without posing a large barrier to “rational” cocaine use. 

• We can manage the supply side like alcohol, perhaps, or prescription drugs, but… we also can “nudge” people towards rational cocaine-related behavior. 

• We can take advantage of the surprising power of default options. 

• The First Default: You are Not Eligible to Purchase Cocaine. 

• If you are of age, you can choose to override this default of ineligibility.

• Pass a test, pay a fee, acquire a cocaine buyer’s license; behave well or you will lose your cocaine buyer’s license!

• The Second Default(s): You Can Only Purchase Cocaine in Moderate Doses.

• Prices, Quantities, Waiting Periods – the default settings on all of these are aimed at enforcing modest consumption. The waiting period involves ordering your cocaine purchases in advance, by three days, say. 

• At some cost (time, money), you can override these default terms for more liberal access to cocaine (if you have a record of unproblematic cocaine-related behavior); alternatively, you can opt-in to more stringent rules, at low cost or even some subsidization. Want to only be allowed to purchase cocaine on weekends? – great, you can impose this restriction, and the suppliers will enforce it.  Want to have a cocaine-free February? Great, you can put in a no-purchases-during-February rule, and the sellers will enforce it.

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