Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin, “Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151(3): 1211-1254, 2003.
• An asymmetric paternalistic regulation creates large gains for the less-than-rationals, while imposing little upon rationals.
• Are there predictable circumstances in which people tend to be less than rational?
• Asymmetric paternalism as a method for correcting internalities. The tradeoff is meant to assure that the interventions do not impose high costs on rationals.
• It cannot be taken as given that people’s choices maximize their well-being. It’s an empirical issue, of course.
• Many current regulations are asymmetrically paternalistic.
• Defaults have to take into account what would be the most common best choice, as well as the possibility that the costs of error are asymmetric.
• Cooling-off periods allow bad decisions to be reversed, but generally lower the value of the decision when it is rational. If sellers bear costs when decisions are reversed, they might want to ensure rational deliberation ex ante. Should consumers be allowed to waive cooling-off periods?
• Constitutions implement the equivalent of cooling-off periods.
• Are there private incentives to provide paternalistic interventions? Maybe the reason such interventions are needed is the reason they will not be demanded.
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