Showing posts with label market design. Show all posts
Showing posts with label market design. Show all posts

Saturday, June 20, 2020

Evers and Imas (2019) on Mental Accounting

Ellen Evers and Alex Imas, “Mental Accounting, Similarity, and Preferences Over the Timing of Outcomes,” September 12, 2019, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452943.

• Do we experience life events in a bundle – a good day, say – or do we experience life more discretely, like a good work day followed by a nice dinner? Our “valuation” (of a day, for instance) will depend on the bundling, because of prospect-theory-style reference points. If we have a good morning, do we record that "event" as complete, in the hedonic books, as it were, and then start fresh in the afternoon?

• We might get more satisfaction if we could consume a good day in two or more parts, as a good morning followed by a good afternoon, as opposed to one indivisible event, a good day. Given "diminishing sensitivity" to gains and losses (a standard element of prospect theory), we would prefer to take gains discretely, and to bundle losses together.

• But can we actually choose how to bundle our experiences to maximize our well-being, to engage in “hedonic editing”? Maybe our control over the mental accounts is limited, maybe similar things (like a good morning and a good afternoon, both spent at the office) in a day will be bundled together.

• Similarity, here, takes the form of shared salient attributes. Temporal proximity is one salient feature, and hence, all else equal, with diminishing sensitivity, people would prefer losses to occur close together and gains to be spread out – but all else is not always equal, sometimes there are other factors (salient similarities) that lead to losses being mentally separated or gains being mentally bundled.

• Evers and Imas suggest that mental bookkeeping is done to economize on the comparison of attributes. At any rate, their “hedonic accounting hypothesis” is that people prefer to suffer similar losses in a short time span but dissimilar losses in a longer time span; alternatively, similar gains are spread over time and dissimilar gains are taken closer together. The similar losses are in the same mental account, and hence, treating them jointly helps (via diminishing sensitivity) to take away some of their sting. Dissimilar losses are sort of fated to be in different mental accounts, so there is no gain to bundling them, and something to be said for postponing one of them.

• In four online experiments (using mTurk, with more than 100 respondents for each of the experiments), the authors find support for their hypotheses: (1) more similar events are more likely to be bundled into a single event; (2) the more similar two negative events, the greater the desire to bundle them (by choosing to experience them in close temporal proximity); (3) the more similar two positive events, the greater the desire to separate them temporally; and (4) rendering events more similar by increasing the salience of their shared characteristics makes them more likely to be assigned to the same mental account. 

Thursday, March 3, 2016

Sandel (2013) on Markets and Morals

Michael J. Sandel, “Market Reasoning as Moral Reasoning: Why Economists Should Re-engage with Political Philosophy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(4): 121-140, Fall 2013.

• Putting goods into the market domain can change their nature; therefore, economics cannot avoid ethics. 

• Does an increase in efficiency make a society better off? The answer depends on one’s view of what constitutes the social good. Economists tend to implicitly adopt a utilitarian approach. Selling slots in universities, or votes, or babies, might promote efficiency, but might nonetheless be morally objectionable. 

• Shouldn’t we be wary of the “voluntary trade is mutually beneficial” claim? Unequal starting points might imply coercion. Are there societal conditions that are not consistent with the provision of meaningful consent to a transaction? 

• Markets might corrupt goods or crowd out other types of incentives. People might do things voluntarily that they would be unwilling to do for payment. 

• Selling spots to attend Congressional hearings would demean the institution. It would be better to distribute tickets by an online lottery, and make the tickets non-transferable. 

• Fines indicate social disapproval; they are not equivalent to fees, and people do not like it when intentional offenders treat fines as fees. 

• The Intuits in Canada receive a quota for killing walruses – an exemption that recognizes the longstanding role of walrus hunting in the Intuit civilization. The sale by the Intuits of some of that quota to “sport” hunters corrupts the meaning of the exemption. A further issue is whether society need respect the perverse preference of hunters to shoot defenseless walruses. 

• Are love and benevolence non-renewable, depletable resources, or are they augmented with use?

Roth (2007) on Repugnance

Alvin E. Roth, “Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3): 37-58, Summer 2007.

• Repugnance often presents a real limit on what types of markets can be implemented; in this sense, repugnance is like resource and incentive constraints. 

• Arguments focusing on the gains to trade have little traction against repugnance of kidney sales. 

• Sometimes repugnance is combined with concerns about negative externalities, addiction, or hidden coercion. 

• Closely related activities can differ substantially on the repugnance scale: dwarf-tossing (often repugnant) v. wife-carrying (often acceptable). The set of transactions that are viewed as repugnant changes over time. [Maybe those kidney sales are becoming less repugnant, too.]

• Sometimes the transactions themselves, as gifts, are not repugnant, but adding money makes them so; many people who object to kidney sales find kidney donation to be admirable.